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There is conflicting evidence as to whether awareness is required for conditioning of the
skin conductance response (SCR). Recently, Schultz and Helmstetter (2010) reported SCR
conditioning in contingency unaware participants by using difficult to discriminate stimuli.
These findings are in stark contrast with other observations in human fear conditioning
research, showing that SCR predominantly reflects contingency learning. Therefore, we
repeated the study by Schultz and Helmstetter and additionally measured conditioning of
the startle response, which seems to be less sensitive to declarative knowledge than SCR.
While we solely observed SCR conditioning in participants who reported awareness of the
contingencies (n = 16) and not in the unaware participants (n = 18), we observed startle
conditioning irrespective of awareness. We conclude that SCR but not startle conditioning
depends on conscious discriminative fear learning.
Keywords: fear conditioning, awareness, skin conductance response, fear potentiated startle, contingency
learning
INTRODUCTION
There is a long-standing debate whether fear learning can occur
without awareness of the relationship between the conditioned
stimulus (CS) and the unconditioned stimulus (US). Some stud-
ies showed that conditioned skin conductance response (SCR)
can take place in absence of contingency awareness (Esteves et al.,
1994; Bechara et al., 1995; Knight et al., 2003, 2006). However,
other studies showed that SCR conditioning can only be observed
in parallel with the conscious expectancy of the CS to be followed
by the US (Dawson and Biferno, 1973; Dawson and Furedy,
1976; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Purkis and Lipp, 2001; Lovibond
and Shanks, 2002; Hamm and Weike, 2005; Weike et al., 2007).
Importantly, under conditions that prevent both awareness and
conditioning of SCR, conditioned startle potentiation could still
be observed (Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Weike et al., 2005, 2007).
The startle fear response is an automatic defensive reflex. It is
potentiated in response to a CS that is associated with a US of
negative valence (electrical stimulation), and can typically not be
observed with USs of neutral valence (vibrotactile stimulation,
reaction time task) (Lipp et al., 1994; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996).
In contrast, affective valence of the US does not modify SCR
conditioning, since it can occur irrespective of the valence of the
US (Lipp et al., 1994; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996). As such, SCR
is considered a non-specific measure of anticipatory arousal. In
addition to the studies that show that SCR conditioning requires
contingency learning (Dawson and Biferno, 1973; Dawson and
Furedy, 1976; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Purkis and Lipp, 2001;
Lovibond and Shanks, 2002; Hamm and Weike, 2005; Weike et al.,
2005, 2007), both pharmacological and cognitive manipulations
revealed that SCR is strongly related to expectancy learning.
That is, propranolol administered before or after fear memory
reactivation left both expectancy and SCR responding intact
but reduced the startle response (Soeter and Kindt, 2010, 2011;
Sevenster et al., 2012a). Moreover, the simple instruction that the
CS would no longer be followed by the US eliminated both dif-
ferential US-expectancy ratings and SCR (Hugdahl and Öhman,
1977; Hugdahl, 1978; Lipp and Edwards, 2002; Sevenster et al.,
2012b) but not the startle fear response (Sevenster et al., 2012b).
These results suggest that SCR responding appears to mirror
expectancy beliefs (see also Lovibond, 2004), whereas the startle
response can act independent from cognitive knowledge. In sum,
there is conflicting evidence on the relation between contingency
learning and SCR. One line of evidence shows that SCR does
not require expectancy learning (Esteves et al., 1994; Bechara
et al., 1995; Knight et al., 2003, 2006), while other evidence
shows that SCR conditioning requires conscious knowledge of the
contingencies (Dawson and Biferno, 1973; Dawson and Furedy,
1976; Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Purkis and Lipp, 2001; Lovibond
and Shanks, 2002; Lovibond, 2004; Hamm and Weike, 2005;
Weike et al., 2005, 2007). Most evidence that SCR dissociates
from expectancy learning comes from studies using a distractor
task or subliminal presentation of the stimuli. These tasks often
rely on post-conditioning questionnaires and can therefore not
decisively demonstrate that contingency awareness was actually
absent during the conditioning session (Dawson and Schell,
1985).
Recent findings (Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010) are in line
with previous studies showing that SCR does not depend on
expectancy learning and challenged the observed correspondence
between contingency learning and SCR responding in other labs
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FIGURE 1 | The conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS−) were either easy
(Easy condition) or difficult to discriminate (Difficult condition).
(Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Lovibond, 2003; Weike et al., 2005, 2007;
Soeter and Kindt, 2010; Sevenster et al., 2012b, 2013). Schultz
and Helmstetter (2010) manipulated contingency awareness by
constructing pairs of stimuli (CS+ and CS−) that were either
easy or difficult to discriminate (see Figure 1). The easy condition
involved a traditional fear discrimination procedure in which
the participants were aware of the contingencies, whereas in
the difficult condition the participants were supposedly unaware
of the contingencies. US-expectancy and SCR were registered
concurrently during the conditioning session. Differential US-
expectancy ratings were observed in the easy but not in the diffi-
cult condition, whereas differential SCR was observed in both the
easy and difficult discrimination condition. These findings indeed
suggest that SCR conditioning does not depend on contingency
awareness.
The dissociation between expectancy learning and SCR condi-
tioning observed by Schultz and Helmstetter (2010) is remarkable
in the light of the typical strong convergence between expectancy
learning and SCR conditioning. One explanation may be that
the manipulations employed in those previous studies are simply
not appropriate for dissociating the two conditioned response
systems. Alternatively, studies that do not find SCR conditioning
among unaware participants often use post-conditioning ques-
tionnaires (Hamm and Vaitl, 1996; Weike et al., 2005, 2007).
Retrospective ratings of awareness are susceptible to forgetting
or interference and may be insensitive to subtle discrimination of
the CSs (Knight et al., 2003; Smith et al., 2005). The concurrent
measurements of US-expectancy ratings and psychophysiological
conditioned responding—a strong feature of the study by Schultz
and Helmstetter (2010)—clearly overcomes this limitation. How-
ever, a shortcoming of the study by Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010) is that more than half of the participants who were meant
to be unaware of the learned association (difficult discrimination
condition) actually demonstrated a certain degree of awareness
of the CS-US contingencies. That is, a more tolerant criterion
for contingency awareness revealed that more than half of the
remaining, supposedly unaware participants (6 out of 10) did
achieve some level of contingency knowledge in the difficult
discrimination condition. The follow-up analyses showed that the
six aware and the four unaware participants did not differ in SCR
conditioning; it was therefore concluded that the results were not
confounded by the participants’ contingency awareness. However,
the small sample sizes (n = 4 vs. n = 6) make the observation of a
significant difference between those two groups unlikely.
To further investigate the role of awareness in conditioned
responding, we repeated the study by Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010), but we increased sample sizes to allow investigation of
differential SCR in participants who unintentionally acquired a
certain degree of awareness and participants who were strictly
unaware within the difficult condition. We expected differential
SCR in the easy condition and for the difficult condition only in
the participants who became aware of the contingencies during
fear conditioning. Given the previously observed dissociation
between US-expectancy learning and the fear potentiated startle
response, we additionally tested whether conditioning of the star-
tle response would occur irrespective of contingency awareness. A
recent replication study demonstrated that trial sequence might
account for the apparently unaware SCR conditioning (Singh
et al., 2013). Singh et al. (2013) tested the effect of trial sequence
because in previous research unaware conditioning effects could
be explained by predictable trial sequence (Wiens et al., 2003).
They observed that despite being classified as being unaware of
the contingencies, participants in the difficult condition reported
greater shock expectancy and SCR to CS+ compared to CS− on
alternating trials. This effect was significantly reversed (greater
responding to CS− than CS+) on non-alternating trials. Given
that trial sequence effects can thus provide an alternative explana-
tion for supposedly unaware conditioning effects, we additionally
explored the effect of predictable stimulus presentation on SCR
and startle conditioning.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-seven (20 male; 17 female) healthy undergraduate students
participated in the study, ranging in age between 18 and 27
years (M = 21.73, SD = 2.31). Participants received either partial
course credit or a small amount of money for their participation.
All participants gave informed consent and were notified that
they could withdraw from participation at any time. Participants
were medically screened to assure they were free from a physical
(i.e., heart disease or epilepsy) or psychiatric disorder. The Ethics
Committee of the University of Amsterdam approved the study.
Participants (n = 37) were randomly assigned to either the easy
(n = 18) or the difficult condition (n = 19). Two unaware par-
ticipants in the easy condition and one aware participant in the
difficult condition were excluded from analysis, resulting in n =
16 in the easy and n = 18 participants in the difficult condition.
APPARATUS
Stimuli
The conditioned stimuli (CS) were adapted from Schultz and
Helmstetter (2010) and consisted of two pairs of complex sine
wave gratings, composed of high and low frequency components
(Figure 1). The high frequency component was equal for all
stimuli. The low frequency components were adjusted so as
to create conditions in which the two stimuli would be easy
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(easy condition) or difficult (difficult condition) to discriminate.
Electrical stimulation of 2 ms was delivered through a pair of
Ag electrodes of 20 by 25 mm with a fixed inter-electrode mid-
distance of 45 mm, attached to the wrist, not the ankle (Schultz
and Helmstetter, 2010). Shock deliverance was controlled by a
Digitimer DS7A constant current stimulator (Hertfordshire, UK).
Between the electrodes and the skin a conductive gel (Signa,
Parker) was applied. US-intensity level was determined by gradu-
ally increasing shock intensity (starting at 1 mA) until subjects
indicated the shock to be “uncomfortable though not painful”.
Note that in the procedure used by Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010) 7.5 mA was the maximum possible output current. Mean
US-intensity is therefore likely to be higher in the current study.
However, US-duration was substantially shorter in our study
(2 vs. 500 ms), decreasing the impact of the US.
Fear potentiated startle
Startle response was measured through electromyography (EMG)
of the right orbicularis oculi muscle. Two 6 mm sintered Ag/AgCl
electrodes filled with a conductive gel (Signa, Parker) were posi-
tioned approximately 1 cm under the pupil and 1 cm below the
lateral canthus, respectively; a ground electrode was placed on
the forehead, 1 cm below hairline (Blumenthal et al., 2005). The
startle probe was a 40 ms duration noise burst (104 dB) with a
rise/fall time shorter than 1 ms, which was presented binaurally
through headphones (Sennheiser, model HD 25-1 II). The EMG
signal was amplified in two stages. The input stage had an input
resistance of 10 MOhm, a frequency response of DC-1500 Hz and
an amplification factor of 200. A 50-Hz notch filter was used to
reduce interference of the mains noise. The second stage amplified
the signal with a variable amplification factor of 0–100 x. The raw
EMG signal was sampled at 1000 Hz and band-pass filtered (28–
500 Hz, Butterworth, 4th order; Blumenthal et al., 2005) to obtain
the cleanest possible data without affecting response amplitude.
After rectifying and contour following (time constant = 10 ms)
the peak amplitude was found by analyzing the first derivative
of the resulting signal in a 30–150 ms interval following probe
onset.
Skin conductance response
Electrodermal activity was measured using an input device with
a sine-shaped excitation voltage (1 V peak-peak) of 50 Hz, which
was derived from the mains frequency. Two Ag/AgCl electrodes
of 20 by 16 mm were attached with adhesive tape to the medial
phalanges of the first and third fingers of the non-preferred hand.
The skin conductance level (SCL) signal from the input device
was converted to 0.2 V/uS by a current to voltage converter.
Startle response and electrodermal activity were recorded with the
software program VSSRP98 at 1000 Hz. SCL was determined at
0.5 s intervals, both in the −2–0 s baseline window and the 0–7 s
window after CS onset. Scores for the entire-interval response
(EIR) were calculated by subtracting the mean SCL for the 2 s
baseline immediately preceding CS onset from the highest SCL
value recorded during the 0–7 s window after CS onset (Pineles
et al., 2009), before the onset of the startle probe. This is a well-
established approach of examining electrodermal reactivity (SCR)
and has been used extensively in human psychophysiological
research (Orr and Lanzetta, 1980; Pitman and Orr, 1986; Orr
et al., 2000; Milad et al., 2005; Pineles et al., 2009; Raes et al.,
2011).
Online unconditioned stimulus (US)-expectancy ratings
US-expectancy was measured continuously (5 samples/s), on an
11-point scale ranging from “certainly no electric stimulus” (−5)
through “uncertain” (0) to “certainly an electric stimulus” (5).
The scale was placed at the bottom of the screen. Participants
rated US-expectancy levels by shifting the cursor on the scale
with use of the mouse. Subjects were not informed about CS-US
contingencies and were instructed to update their US-expectancy
throughout the experiment. Continuous US-expectancy ratings
during the last 4 s of CS presentation were averaged for each
CS presentation. Ratings were converted to a 0–100 scale to be
consistent with Schultz and Helmstetter (2010).
Subjective assessments
Evaluation of the US was assessed on an 11-point scale rang-
ing from “unpleasant” (−5) to “pleasant” (5). General level of
anxiety was measured with the Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T;
Spielberger et al., 1970) to control for general level of anxiety.
PROCEDURE
After giving informed consent participants were seated in front
of a computer screen in a sound-attenuated room. The EMG,
SCR and shock electrodes were attached and US-intensity level
was determined by gradually increasing shock intensity (starting
at 1 mA) until subjects indicated the shock to be “uncom-
fortable though not painful”. The experiment started with 10
startle habituation trials to stabilize baseline startle reactivity.
To assess baseline startle responding during the experimen-
tal phase, startle probes alone (Noise Alone; NA) were pre-
sented in addition to the CS presentations. Throughout the
entire conditioning phase participants continuously rated their
US-expectancy.
Fear conditioning
The testing procedure was adapted from Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010). In the current study NA trials were presented in addition
to the CS presentations. Stimuli (CS+, CS−, NA) were presented
randomly in a block of three trials. The CSs consisted of two
different images depicting complex sine wave gratings. Both CSs
were presented eight times, with a duration of 8 s. The experiment
consisted of eight consecutive blocks. One of the images (CS+)
was paired with a mild shock to the wrist (US) on all the eight
trials, whereas the other picture was never paired with a shock
(CS−). A startle probe (40 ms; 104 dB) was delivered 7 s after
CS onset, followed by the US after another 500 ms. The US
consisted of an electrical stimulus (2 ms). Note that delivery of
neither the startle probe nor the US interfered with measurement
of SCR as maximum SCR score was determined during 7 s
following stimulus onset before the startle probe and the US
onset. Intertrial intervals (ITI) varied from 15 s to 25 s with
an average of 20 s. The stimuli that were easy to discriminate
served as CSs in the easy condition and the stimuli that were
difficult to discriminate served as CSs in the difficult condition
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(Figure 1). Participants did not receive information about the
CS-US relationship. They were instructed to continuously place
the cursor of the mouse on the position on the scale correspond-
ing to their US-expectancy, ranging from “certainly no electric
stimulus” (−5) through “uncertain” (0) to “certainly an electric
stimulus” (5). After conclusion of the experimental phase, partic-
ipants filled in the trait anxiety (STAI-T) questionnaire and rated
US-pleasantness.
AWARENESS
Continuous US-expectancy ratings during the last 4 s of CS
duration were averaged for each CS presentation. Awareness
was defined according to the two criteria set by Schultz and
Helmstetter (2010). First, participants were classified as aware
when in a sliding window of five consecutive CS presentations rat-
ings to the CS+ were higher than 75 and ratings to the CS− were
lower than 25 with at least two trials of each CS type. In the second
series of analyses the effect of trial sequence on conditioned
responding in the easy and difficult condition was taken into
account. Second, participants were classified as aware according
to the more tolerant criterion for contingency awareness when in
a sliding window of four consecutive CS presentations ratings to
the CS+ were higher than 50 and ratings to the CS− were lower
than 50 with at least two trials of each CS type.
DATA ANALYSIS
US-intensity, US-evaluation and STAI-T scores were subjected
to ANOVAs with condition (easy vs. difficult) as between-
subjects factor. Startle and skin conductance response outliers
were defined by means of within-participants Z-scores (Z > 3)
and replaced by linear trend at point. SCRs were mean corrected,
to equalize the opportunity for each subject to contribute to
the group mean (Lovibond et al., 1988). The mean value used
for correction was based on the eight conditioning trials. US-
expectancy, skin conductance and startle potentiation data were
averaged over all eight conditioning trials, resulting in a single
mean response to the CS+ and a single mean response to the
CS−. US-expectancy ratings, startle responses and electrodermal
activity were then subjected to a mixed analysis of variance
for repeated measures (ANOVA) with condition (easy vs. dif-
ficult) as between-subjects factor and stimulus (CS+ vs. CS−)
and trial sequence (alternating vs. non-alternating) as within-
subjects factor. The alpha level was set at 0.05 for statistical
analyses.
RESULTS
EASY VS. DIFFICULT
First, we analyzed the data according to Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010). Awareness was defined as five consecutive CS presenta-
tions during which US-expectancy ratings to the CS+were higher
than 75 and US-expectancy ratings to the CS− were lower than
25. Based on this criterion two unaware participants in the easy
condition and one aware participant in the difficult condition
were excluded from further analysis, resulting in n = 16 in the easy
and n = 18 participants in the difficult condition. The individually
set shock intensity ranged from 6 to 40 mA (M = 19.09, SD =
8.83). There was no difference in US-intensity, US-evaluation and
Table 1 | Mean values (SD) of the US-intensity, US-evaluation, and
trait anxiety (STAI-T) for the Easy (n = 16) and Difficult conditions
(n = 18).
Easy Difficult
US-intensity (mA) 21.6 (9.5) 16.8 (7.8)
US-evaluation day 1 −2.4 (1.4) −2.6 (1.0)
Trait anxiety 34.5 (9.0) 33.8 (5.4)
reported trait anxiety (Fs < 1) between the aware and unaware
participants (Table 1).
Unconditioned stimulus (US)-expectancy ratings
Analysis revealed a difference between conditions in differential
US-expectancy (stimulus x condition; F(1,32) = 173.43, p< 0.001,
η2p = 0.84). US-expectancy ratings to the CS+ were higher com-
pared to the CS− in the easy condition (main effect stimulus;
F(1,15) = 311.99, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.95), while this difference was
absent in the difficult condition (main effect stimulus; F(1,17) < 1)
(Figure 2A).
Skin conductance response
We observed a near-significant difference in SCR conditioning
between the easy and difficult condition (stimulus × condition;
F(1,32) = 2.99, p < 0.094, η2p = 0.09) (Figure 2B). In line with
the US-expectancies, we found higher SCR to the CS+ compared
to the CS− in the easy condition (main effect stimulus; F(1,15) =
5.55, p < 0.032, η2p = 0.27), while we did not observe such
differential responding in the difficult condition (main effect
stimulus; F(1,17) < 1). Thus in contrast to Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010), we found that contingency awareness is a prerequisite for
SCR conditioning.
Startle fear response
The easy and difficult condition differed neither on startle habit-
uation (trials 1–10; stimulus × condition; F(4.78,152.99) < 1) nor
on startle responding during the ITI (trials 1–8; stimulus ×
condition; F(5.03,161) < 1.12). Even though the easy and difficult
condition did not differ in conditioning of differential startle fear
response (stimulus× condition; F(1,32) < 1), we observed general
startle conditioning evidenced by stronger startle potentiation to
the CS+ compared to the CS− (main effect stimulus; F(1,32) =
5.84, p < 0.022, η2p = 0.15) (Figure 2C). Follow-up analyses
showed that conditioning of the startle was present in the difficult
condition (main effect stimulus; F(1,17) = 4.78, p < 0.043, η2p =
0.22) but not in the easy condition (main effect stimulus; F(1,15)
< 1.66). Note that while startle conditioning was absent on the
first trial (main effect stimulus; F(1,15) < 1), there was a significant
effect of differential responding during the second to the fifth trial
of early conditioning in the easy condition (trials 2–5; main effect
stimulus; F(1,15) = 4.61, p< 0.05, η2p = 0.24). This effect collapsed
towards the end of conditioning (trials 6–8; main effect stimulus;
F(1,15) < 1).
TOLERANT CRITERION OF AWARENESS
Schultz and Helmstetter (2010) adjusted the contingency criterion
to divide the difficult condition into participants who approached
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FIGURE 2 | US-expectancy ratings (A), skin conductance responses (B) and startle responses (C) to the CS+ and CS− for the Easy (n = 16) and Difficult (n =
18) conditions. Error bars represent s.e.m.
the criteria for awareness and participants who did not approach
awareness. They argued that by this means it could be ensured
that differential SCR in the difficult condition was not influenced
by a few participants who may have achieved some level of con-
tingency knowledge. Participants were classified as approaching
contingency knowledge when they rated the CS+ over 50 and
the CS− under 50 on four consecutive trials in a sliding window.
We applied a similar criterion to the difficult condition in the
current study which resulted in a small sample (n = 4 unaware).
Note that we did not further analyze within the difficult group.
First, in contrast to Schultz and Helmstetter (2010) we do not
need to exclude that differential SCR for the difficult condition
was influenced by a few participants, given that differential SCR
was absent in the difficult condition. Second, as mentioned in the
introduction, comparing groups of n = 4 with n = 15 makes it
unlikely to find any group differences.
EASY VS. DIFFICULT: TRIAL SEQUENCE
A recent study showed that stimulus presentation sequence could
account for unaware differential SCR (Singh et al., 2013). Thus,
what initially appeared to be unaware differential SCR condition-
ing could also be explained by expectancy “learning”, arising from
a predictable trial sequence. In the current study we presented
the stimuli (CS+, CS−, NA) randomly within a block, for eight
consecutive blocks. Similar to the Schultz and Helmstetter study,
this presentation scheme increases the probability of shock deliv-
erance when a preceding trial is not reinforced. In contrast, when
a preceding trial is reinforced the probability of shock deliverance
decreases. Therefore, we re-analyzed the data with trial sequence
(alternating vs. non-alternating) as an additional within subjects
factor. Following Singh et al. (2013) we separately averaged condi-
tioned responses (US-expectancy, SCR, startle response) for CS+
and CS− trials that were preceded by an opposite CS type (e.g.,
CS− followed by CS+; alternating trial) or a similar CS type (e.g.,
CS+ followed by CS+; non-alternating trial). The first two trials
were not included in the analyses, since expectancies based on trial
sequence could not yet have been formed for those trials (Singh
et al., 2013). Note that trial sequences were not fixed, since stimu-
lus presentation (CS+, CS−, NA) was randomized within a block
of 3 trials, resulting in minimally 3 and maximally 7 alternating
trials and minimally 0 and maximally 4 non-alternating trials.
Unconditioned stimulus (US)-expectancy ratings
Differential ratings were greater in the easy condition compared to
the difficult condition on both alternating (stimulus× condition;
F(1, 32) = 83.82, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.72) and non-alternating trials
(stimulus × condition; F(1, 28) = 54.36, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.66)
(Figure 3A). Both on alternating (main effect stimulus; F(1, 15) =
350.20, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.96) and non-alternating trials (main
effect stimulus; F(1, 12) = 78.71, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.87) responding
to the CS+ was higher compared to the CS− in the easy con-
dition. Participants in the difficult condition capitalized on trial
sequence, evidenced by higher ratings to the CS+ compared to the
CS− on alternating trials (main effect stimulus; F(1, 17) = 6.56, p<
0.020, η2p = 0.28), while on non-alternating trials this pattern was
reversed with higher responding to the CS− compared to the CS+
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FIGURE 3 | US-expectancy ratings (A), skin conductance responses (B) and
startle responses (C) to the CS+ and CS− on alternating and
non-alternating trials for the Easy (n = 16) and Difficult (n = 18) conditions.
Error bars represent s.e.m. * p < 0.05.
(main effect stimulus; F(1, 16) = 6.06, p< 0.026, η2p = 0.28). Thus,
in line with previous findings (Singh et al., 2013), we found that
trial sequence can result in US-expectancy learning when stimuli
are in fact difficult to discriminate.
Skin conductance response
Differential responding was greater in the easy condition com-
pared to the difficult condition on the alternating trials (stimulus
× condition; F(1,32) = 7.38, p < 0.011, η2p = 0.19) (Figure 3B).
Indeed, responding to the CS+ was higher compared to the CS−
in the easy condition on alternating trials (main effect stimulus;
F(1,15) = 11.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42). Contrary to the previous
findings (Singh et al., 2013), this effect was not observed in the
difficult condition (main effect stimulus; F(1,17) < 1). The easy
and difficult condition did not differ on SCR on non-alternating
trials (stimulus × condition; F(1,28) < 1). Follow-up analyses
confirmed that differential SCR was absent in both conditions on
non-alternating trials (main effect stimulus; Fs < 1.05).
Startle fear response
The easy and difficult condition did not differ on startle response
on both alternating and non-alternating trials (stimulus × con-
dition; Fs < 1) (Figure 3C). There was near-significantly more
startle responding to the CS+ compared to the CS− on both alter-
nating (main effect stimulus; F(1,32) = 3.50, p < 0.071, η2p = 0.10)
and non-alternating trials (main effect stimulus; F(1,28) = 2.96,
p < 0.096, η2p = 0.10). In sum, we replicated the US-expectancy
results of Singh et al. (2013). Predictable trial sequence did
facilitate expectancy learning in spite of difficult to discriminate
stimuli. However, trial sequence only facilitated differential SCR
in the easy but not in the difficult condition. Differential startle
responding was not affected by trial sequence.
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether startle
and SCR conditioning correspond with contingency awareness.
First, the main finding was that startle conditioning can occur
independent of contingency awareness. We observed differential
conditioning of the fear potentiated startle, in spite of difficult to
discriminate CS. While the easy and difficult conditions did not
differ in startle responding, we unexpectedly did not observe star-
tle conditioning in the easy condition. Thus, startle responding
to the CS+ was not higher than startle responding to the CS−
when analyzing the eight conditioning trials together. However,
participants in the easy condition showed startle conditioning at
the beginning of the fear acquisition phase, but this effect was
no longer present by the end of conditioning. Visual inspection
of the graphs suggests a similar pattern of conditioning over
trials for the startle response in the difficult condition and SCR
in the easy condition. The observation of a transient physiolog-
ical conditioning effect contrasts with our previous studies in
which we did observe SCR and startle conditioning during late
acquisition (Kindt et al., 2009; Soeter and Kindt, 2010; Sevenster
et al., 2012a). In these studies we used fear-relevant stimuli,
while in the current study CSs consisted of neutral pictures. The
absence of differential psychophysiological responding at the end
of conditioning in the current study might be explained by faster
habituation to neutral CSs than to fear-relevant stimuli (Lovibond
et al., 1994).
Second, SCR appeared to covary with the US-expectancy rat-
ings, demonstrated by differential SCR conditioning in the easy
but not in the difficult condition. While Schultz and Helmstetter
(2010) found more electrodermal responding to the CS+ com-
pared to the CS−, irrespective of the difficulty to perceptually
discriminate these stimuli, we did not replicate these findings.
More than half of the participants in the difficult condition
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showed contingency awareness according to the tolerant criterion
in their study, but only 4 out of the 19 participants in the
difficult condition met the same awareness criterion in the current
study. Therefore, SCR conditioning in the study by Schultz and
Helmstetter (2010) can arguably be attributed to the relatively
large sample of participants who unintentionally acquired some
level of contingency awareness in the difficult condition. It is hard
to explain the differences in proportion of aware vs. unaware
subjects between the study by Schultz and Helmstetter and the
current study. We might therefore question the reliability of this
approach to assess contingency awareness. Note, however, that the
validity of the currently used approach is higher relative to the use
of post-experimental questionnaires, as the online measurement
of expectancy learning overcomes many of the limitations of
retrospective contingency assessment (see Lovibond and Shanks,
2002; Schultz and Helmstetter, 2010).
A previously proposed alternative explanation for the findings
by Schultz and Helmstetter (2010) is that participants classified
as aware in the difficult condition could have capitalized on the
trial sequence to predict the occurrence of the US, as was con-
vincingly argued in a recent replication study (Singh et al., 2013).
When presentation of the CS+ and CS− followed an alternating
sequence, participants not only showed higher US-expectancy to
the CS+ compared to the CS−, but also differential SCR. Thus,
although incapable of discriminating the two CSs, predictable
trial sequence may have resulted in unintended “contingency
awareness” and subsequent differential SCR conditioning. We
partly replicated this effect, by showing that expectancy “learning”
occurred on alternating but not on non-alternating trials when
stimuli were difficult to discriminate. If unintended contingency
awareness indeed results in SCR conditioning, as demonstrated by
Singh et al. (2013), SCR conditioning should have been present
on alternating trials, irrespective of condition. However, while
we observed differential SCR on alternating trials in the easy
condition, expectancy “learning” did not result in differential SCR
in the difficult condition. In the current study participants in the
difficult condition did apparently not benefit from a predictable
trial sequence. Our design differed from Singh et al. (2013) in
that their conditioning procedure was extended with two more
blocks of CS presentations. These additional trials might have
been essential for the participants to capitalize on rules about
the trial sequence. Surprisingly, we found that differential SCR
was affected by trial sequence in aware participants. This shows
that awareness may be required but not necessarily sufficient for
differential SCR to occur, since SCR was absent for the non-
alternating trials in participants who reported awareness of the
contingency. This stresses the urge to control for trial sequence
in fear conditioning research, especially when using SCR as a
measure of conditioned responding. Notably, differential startle
responding occurred irrespective of condition and trial sequence.
Fear is considered to be characterized by both high arousal
and negative valence (Lang, 1995). While it would be tempting
to speculate on the differential role of valence and arousal in SCR
and startle conditioning (Bradley and Vrana, 1993; Bradley et al.,
1993; Lang, 1995), it is hard to actually dissociate valence and
arousal by means of these psychophysiological measures. Poten-
tiation of the startle reflex is generally associated with valence
and SCR with arousal. But the startle reflex is also modulated
by arousal: negative pictures evaluated as most arousing produce
greatest startle potentiation, while positive pictures evaluated as
most arousing produce greatest startle inhibition. In contrast, an
increase of SCR has been demonstrated for both negative and
positive pictures which are evaluated as most arousing (Cuthbert
et al., 1996). Thus, negative valence engages the defensive system
and arousal in turn modulates the degree of activation of the
defensive system. In sum, it is hard to distinguish between the
influence of valence and arousal on startle conditioning under
circumstances that induce both as is probably the case in fear con-
ditioning. Nevertheless, given that valence is a necessary condition
for startle potentiation to occur while SCR can be established
independent from negative valence, the startle response does seem
a more specific index of fear than SCR.
In line with previous evidence, the current study shows that
the startle response does not mirror expectancy learning and SCR.
The dissociation between the response systems raises important
questions concerning the function of unaware startle condition-
ing. Remarkably, the unaware startle conditioning effect seems
to be of a transient nature, since it is no longer observed during
an extinction phase immediately following conditioning (Weike
et al., 2007). Imaging research already showed that conditioning-
related neural responses can take place in absence of awareness
and SCR conditioning (Tabbert et al., 2011). It would be inter-
esting to see whether evidence for an intact memory represen-
tation of unaware conditioning can still be observed at a later
retention test. If there is no indication that the immediately devel-
oped unaware conditioned responding outlasts the conditioning
phase—either behaviorally or neurally—the question is whether
there is any adaptive value in the online but transient development
of automatic conditioned responding.
The current findings are not easily reconciled with a single-
process model of fear learning. This account would predict that
contingency awareness affects the startle response to a similar
degree as expectancy learning and SCR. Yet, we demonstrated
that, contrary to the startle response, acquisition of both US-
expectancy and SCR no longer takes place when using difficult-
to-discriminate stimuli. As such, the current findings suggest that
fear learning involves at least two processes. The US-expectancy
ratings and the closely associated SCR seem to reflect the propo-
sitional level of associative fear learning, whereas the startle
response may be better explained in terms of a more automatic,
low-level index of fear. The finding that the conditioned responses
involved in associative learning rely on different neural circuits
further challenges the single-process account. That is, declarative
knowledge of the CS-US contingencies relies among other brain
areas on the hippocampal complex (Hamm and Weike, 2005;
Weike et al., 2005; Hunsaker and Kesner, 2013). In contrast,
the startle response is an amygdala-initiated response and there-
fore considered to reflect the brain’s subcortical defense system
(Walker and Davis, 2002; LeDoux, 2003) (for a more elaborate
discussion on the single vs. dual process account and its neural
underpinnings see Sevenster et al., 2012b).
Note that while we consider SCR not an optimal correlate for
fear, we do not argue that SCR is not a suitable measure in human
fear conditioning research. During standard fear conditioning
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and extinction procedures, the measures corresponding to dif-
ferent response systems generally converge into similar learning
patterns (Vansteenwegen et al., 2005; Soeter and Kindt, 2010,
2011; Vervliet et al., 2010; Sevenster et al., 2012a,b). Only
specific manipulations—either pharmacological or behavioral—
may reveal the differences between these conditioned responses
(Soeter and Kindt, 2010, 2011; Sevenster et al., 2012a,b, 2013).
In human fear conditioning research, multiple indices of the
behavioral expression of fear (e.g., US expectancies, distress rat-
ings, SCR, startle potentiation) are usually obtained for reasons
of cross-validation. Given that these measures of fear learning
do not necessarily converge (Hamm and Weike, 2005; Kindt
et al., 2009; Soeter and Kindt, 2010; Sevenster et al., 2012a,b,
2013; Beckers et al., 2013), future research should incorporate
this apparent divergence by predicting a priori (differential)
effects for the different dependent variables used to measure fear
learning.
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